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CONFUSION OF THE TERMS "PROXIMATE"
AND "DIRECT"*
Although it would be unreasonable to suppose that per-
fect exactness of legal terminology would be a panacea for
all the ills that beset humanity in the adjudication of its
disputes, it seems perfectly reasonable to believe that glaring
inexactness and confusion in the use of legal terms is one
of the important causes of obscure and uncertain legal
thinking and of consequent irregularity and inefficiency in
the administration of justice, and that the attaining of a
higher degree of exactness would tend toward clarity of
thought and toward a somewhat more systematic disposition
of cases.' The terms "proximate" and "direct" have been
used, in too loose a manner, as synonymous, thus sometimes
making the issue less clear than it could be made if the terms
were used with more of regard for their true and usually
accepted meanings.
*This article is a revision of an article that was published in 86 CENT. L.
JoUR. 224 (Now Lawyer and Banker). It is reprinted with the permission of the
author and the Lawyer and Banker.
1 Of course, when one considers the fluid nature of much of the law of torts,
particularly the law of negligence, it must be realized that there are limits to the
efficacy of improvements by attempts merely to stabilize legal terminology. See:
HonFFLD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS; GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE
CAUSE.
The tendency of lawyers to confuse the terms "proximate" and "direct" seems
to be merely part of a broader tendency to collect a fog around many, if not
most, Latin derivatives. In the period from before the twelfth to a time after the
sixteenth century, the English language was poor in words of the kind needed in
the practice of law and of other learned professions. Latin words and Latin
derivatives were employed by English lawyers possessing little or no knowledge
of the Latin language. The Year Books in the thirteenth century bear witness
abundantly. In the year 1202, cases give us: roberia for robbery, robaverunt for
robbed, gardino for garden, burgaths fuit for "he had burglary committed against
him," etc. As late as 1587, we have in shopa sua for "in his shop," in Bloss v.
Holman, Owen, 52. Obviously, the lawyers knew so little Latin that they ran
English words through Latin conjugations and declensions in order to fill out
deficiencies in their vocabularies. With law Latin thus merrily started on its way
by a bar ignorant of Latin words, is it strange that Latin derivatives in legal
language have come to mean almost anything?
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The terms "proximate" and "direct," as used in connec-
tion with the law of liability and of damages, have different
meanings; and these meanings are probably about as well-
defined in a general way as terms so comprehensive can
ever be. The fact that these words have widely different
meanings is not unknown to any moderately well-informed
lawyer; but courts have occasionally used them, in the dis-
cussion of important cases, as if they were synonymous and
interchangeable. This may seem unimportant; but the error
has clearly had an undesirable influence in the shaping of
the law of proximate cause, so-called, tending, as it does, to
prevent our seeing exactly whither we are headed in the
development of this important subject.
"Direct damages are those which are so closely connected
with the wrong complained of that they may be said to be
involved in the assertion of the right of action. In the case
of personal injury, bodily injury and pain; in that of libel,
damage to reputation; in that of conversion, loss of the thing
converted; in that of trespass upon land, dainage to the
property; in that of the breach of a contract, the loss of the
advantage which was the object of the contract,-all are
direct. Proximate damages (which include direct damages)
are such as flow proximately from the cause of action, that
is, are so connected with it as results of it, that the law re-
gards the person responsible for the cause of action as
responsible also for them. Remote damages are all other
results not so connected." '
DIRECT I CONSEQUENTIAL
PROXIMATE I REMOTE
If the line below be taken as representing all results, we
see that all direct results are within the portion of the line
marked "proximate," but that not all proximate results are
2 SEDmwicK, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES (2nd ed.) 45, 46.
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within that portion of the line marked "direct." The fact
that all direct results are proximate is probably one of the
facts resulting in the confusion of the two terms. Perhaps
an even more potent cause of the confusion is the similarity
of the meanings of the two terms in the every-day language
of the laity.
Whatever may be the cause of the occasional treating of
these words as if they were synonymous, it can safely be said
that the above quotation from A. G. Sedgwick represents
the law as exhibited clearly by the overwhelming weight of
authority. Any attempt to treat the two words as having
exactly the same meaning will result in more of trouble than
it is possible to calculate. If we treat both terms as having
the meaning properly given to "direct" and say that all dam-
ages, in order to be recoverable, must be direct, we eliminate
from our law all possibility of any recovery for any kind of
consequential damage. On the other hand, if we treat both
terms as having the usual meaning accorded to "proximate,"
we raise the troublesome question whether we shall then
require proof of proximtiy of cause and result in the most
ordinary and most obvious cases of direct damage.
Of all the cases involving the question of proximity, neg-
ligence cases are the most difficult and frequently the most
misleading, the question of the fact of negligence often being
hopelessly mixed with the question of the proximate relation
of the negligence to the injury. In an Alabama case,3 a boy,
nine and a half years old, attempted to climb upon a freight
train and enjoy a ride. In violation of a village ordinance,
the train was then going at a faster rate than four miles per
hour. The boy missed his footing, fell, and was killed. The
court held that the railroad company was not liable, as its
negligence was not the proximate cause of the wrong. Judg-
3 Western Ry. v. Mutch, 97 Ala. 194, 11 So. 894, 21 L. R. A. 316, 38 Am.
St. Rep. 179 (1892).
No attempt is made in this article to make an exhaustive study of numerous
cases. A few typical cases have been selected as illustrations.
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ment for the defendant could more easily and simply have
been sustained on the ground that the defendant had vio-
lated no duty toward the boy and that therefore there was
no negligence upon which to ground the action. But the
court, instead of doing this very obvious thing, proceeded to
discuss the relation of the violation of the ordinance to the
damage, quoting with approval the following passage from
the American and English Encyclopedia of Law:4
"To constitute actionable negligence, there must be not only a cas-
ual connection between the negligence complained of and the injury
suffered, but the connection must be by a natural and unbroken se-
quence, without intervening efficient causes, so that but for the negli-
gence of the defendant the injury would not have occurred. It must
not only be a cause, but it must be the proximate, that is the direct and
immediate, efficient cause of the injury."
Probably the first sentence of this quotation would be
generally approved; but the latter proposition, that negli-
gence, in order to be actionable "must be proximate, that
is, the direct and immediate, efficient cause of the injury,"
may well give us pause, since it restricts "proximate" to
"direct." If a negligent defendant is never to be held liable
for any except direct and immediate effects of his negligence,
negligent persons will probably escape, in most instances,
from liability for some of the most injurious consequences
of their negligent acts.
One very well-known case,' in which a railroad company
was very properly held liable for a miscarriage consequent
upon a long walk which a passenger found necessary because
of being negligently directed to leave the train three miles
from her destination, treats the miscarriage as being a
"direct" result. It would seem reasonable to treat such a
result as being proximate rather than direct. Undoubtedly
the case is right in its result, when all the circumstances are
considered; but can we not make better sense out of the dis-
4 NEGLIGENCE, 16 AM. & ENG. ENCY. oF LAW 431.
5 Brown v. Chicago, M, & St. P. Ry. Co., 54 Wis. 342, 11 N. W. 356, 41
Am. Rep. 41 (1882).
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cussion by substituting "proximate" for "direct" in the fol-
lowing excerpt from the opinion of Justice Taylor in this
case:
"In the case at bar the question to be determined is whether the
negligent act of the defendant's employe in putting the plaintiffs and
their child off the train in the nighttime, at the place where they did,
was the direct cause of the injury complained of by the plaintiffs, or
whether it was only a remote cause for which no action lies."
The question was not whether the court should choose to
denominate the result as "direct" or as "remote," but rather
whether it should choose to call it "proximate" or "remote."
Better yet, it might be said that the real issue was simply,
"Was there casual connection between defendant's wrong
and the miscarriage?" 6 Of course, there would be little dif-
ficulty in saying that injury to health and a miscarriage
were results that were protected against by the rule of con-
duct to the effect that defendant must discharge a woman
passenger at the right station.
Later, in the same court, in Chamberlain v. City of Osh-
kosh a case wherein a city had negligently permitted a hole
to exist in a street, the hole became filled with water, and
the water became frozen, thus producing ice on which a
pedestrian fell and was injured, the city was held not liable
for the injury, on the ground that "the hole was only the
remote cause, or cause of causes which produced the result,
and was not the direct, efficient, or adequate cause, which
alone is actionable." The court confused "direct" with "prox-
imate," as will be seen by the following extract from the
opinion:
6 GREEN, RATIONALE op PRoxI ATE CAUSE 146.
7 84 Wis. 289, 54 N. W. 618, 19 L. R. A. 513, 36 Am. St. Rep. 928 (1893).
It is interesting to notice that the Wisconsin court, which has thus used the
words "proximate" and "direct" rather loosely in these two cases, has, in its
practical application of rules of causation, been, in most cases, far-sighted, liberal,
practical, and clearly just to the plaintiff who seeks to recover consequential
damages. See McNamara v. Village of Clintonville, 62 Wis. 207, 22 N. W. 472,
51 Am. Rep. 722 (1885).
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"The depression was the cause of the water accumulating there, and
the water, combined with a low temperature, caused the ice to form
which injured the plaintiff. The depression was a remote cause or cause
of causes. The proximate or direct cause was the ice, and this must be
the cause of action. 'Causa proxima, non remota, spectatur.'-The prox-
imate, and not the remote, cause must be considered. The cause nearest
in order of causation, which is adequate to produce the result, is the
direct cause. In law, only the direct cause is considered. These are
familiar maxims."
If the reasoning here is correct, it follows that damages for
consequential loss never can be recovered. It would also
follow that the decision, by the same court, that the plain-
tiff in Brown v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.' could recover
for illness occurring as a consequential result of the direct
injury, is all wrong; which probably few lawyers would be
willing to admit. One source of trouble in the Chamberlain
case is that the court fails to make any distinction whatever
between "direct" and "proximate" and to recognize the fact
that damages for consequential losses can ever be recovered.
Another source of difficulty is the willingness of the court
to treat the "proximate cause" problem as a thing to be
settled by the application of a fixed and arbitrary rule in-
stead of regarding the problem as one varying according to
the facts and largely for the jury. Fortunately, such arti-
ficial reasoning, which has an appearance of right or logic
only when one quickly glances at the veneer of seemingly
plausible statements as to directness and proximity,9 is not
8 Op. cit. supra note 5.
9 Both Brown v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., op. cit. supra note 5, and
Chamberlain v. City of Oshkosh, op. cit. supra note 7, are frequently used as
material for study in law schools; and probably it is just as well that they be
so used, as these cases seem to have influenced the development of the law of
proximate cause in a measure out of proportion to their accuracy of expression.
It is necessary that the law student study the loosely reasoned and inaccurately
expressed opinions that have had any real part in shaping our law; but, if the
student did not have any lectures or textbooks to set him right on the subject of
proximate cause, it is probable that the study of these cases would frequently help
to mingle proximity and directness in one confused mass in the mind of the
student and to cause him to forget that there is any difference between the two
terms. The fact that such cases are regarded as leading cases, and the further
fact that there is an element of truth in their implications, often tend to make
even the most experienced lawyer accept them as law, without questioning their
general soundness of calculating the final far-reaching effect of accepting the rule
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always followed in cases similar to this one on the facts.1"
To say that all proximate results are direct, is like saying
that all sheep are lambs. Some proximate results are direct,
and others are consequential. To say that all results not
direct are not proximate, is just as fallacious.
In Brown v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. the plaintiff's
illness and miscarriage constituted consequential damage of
a kind commonly called "proximate." In Chamberlain v.
City of Oshkosh, it may well be contended that the plaintiff's
fall and the damage to her person were results proximate
though consequential.
In a personal injury case, destruction of tissue and bruises
may be direct results of the negligent act of defendant; but
doctors' and hospital bills, loss of earnings, and mental and
physical suffering may be proximate, though consequential,
results.
"Proximate," as used in a great many decisions, is a mere
question-begging term, the court calling the damage "proxi-
mate" because it thinks that it is just to allow recovery
therefor, and then proceeding to say that damages can be
recovered therefor because the damage is proximate. Yet,
to make damage legally compensable, it need not be direct.
The real question is, "Is the damaging result complained of
really an encroachment upon an interest of plaintiff protect-
ed by the rule of conduct invoked?" ix A result against which
there is legal protection may in fact be very remote, al-
though, if a court is going to allow damages for it, it will
call the remote result "proximate." A compensable result
may be exceedingly remote, if it only be within the protec-
tion of the legal rule of conduct invoked. Of course, this is not
denying that proximity and remoteness are sometimes per-
of the particular case (perhaps one of unusual circumstances) as a universal and
unfailing rule of law.
1q Adams v. Town of Chicopee, 147 Mass. 440, 18 N. E. 231 (1888); Gay-
lord v. City of New Britain, 58 Conn. 398, 20 At]. 365, 8 L.R. A. 752 (1890);
McCloskey v. Moies, 19 R. I. 297, 33 Ad. 225 (1895); and other cases.
11 See GREEN, RATIO.NALE OF PaOXIMATE CAUSE, Chapter I.
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suasive in a close case. Too much of the time, in the jargon
of the courts, "proximate damages" signifies exactly "re-
coverable damages." A wrong may be a cause of causes and
still, in every often accepted legal sense, be proximate to the
wrong inflicted by the defendant.
Probably most lawyers agree that, strictly speaking, "di-
rect" and "proximate" are not synonymous; and probably
most of the judges and writers who have fallen into the use
of the word "direct" as signifying "proximate" would not
care to argue seriously that only direct damage is ever
proximate. If judicial language in such cases were so framed
as to say what is meant to be said, and if there were greater
strictness of expression in all decisions, we should have judi-
cial opinions that would constitute somewhat more satisfac-
tory precedents for the decision ndt only of exactly similar
cases, but also of cases of the same general class. Of course,
it has long been understood by many lawyers that, in con-
struing mary of the cases on causation, including a number
of the leading ones, we have to consider them as precedents
for what they mean and do rather than for what they say.
Perhaps with the development of our modern case law,
with judicial opinions verbally dictated to a stenographer,
and the rapid increase, during the past sixty-five years, of
law study by the case method, the art of verbal definition is
being lost any way; and few real scholars will regret the
passing of the time when the learning of mere legal defini-
tions constituted a large part of a law curriculum. Yet, if
we are to have any of the clearest possible precedents, on
direct and proximate results, or on any other subject, we
must come to something that approaches a reasonable degree
of uniformity of meaning of each legal term. The meanings
of "direct" and "proximate" recognized as correct by the
great weight of authority should be given uniform recogni-
tion.
Ralph S. Bauer
De Paul University.
